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ABSTRACT 
In ecosystems where collaboration between firms is advantageous or even necessary to 
progress firm innovation, buy-in must be won from stakeholders to enable operative actors to do 
so. Flashy ideas and big promises may carry weight in the process of winning them over, but 
convincing stakeholders of the legitimacy of the proposed collaboration is paramount. In this 
paper, we investigate how actors within a firm engage in a bifurcated legitimacy campaign to 
coerce internal and external stakeholders into supporting an innovating orchestration system. 
Drawing on a unique case study at one of Europe's leading IT service integrators, and drawing on 
institutional theory and ecosystems literatures, we specifically look at shifting motives, 
expectations, and legitimacy-building strategies through a process lens to shed light on how an 
incumbent's internal and external stakeholders can be cleverly made to work for each other. 
Keywords​: Orchestrator; nascent ecosystem; High-tech industries; Institutional Theory; 






Bifurcated Legitimacy Strategies for Stakeholder Support 
In high-tech business ecosystems, managers must strike a key balance between exploring 
new innovation opportunities that will allow their firms to access strategic ecosystemic positions 
and simultaneously adhering to the expectations set upon them by their stakeholders. Especially 
due to a high degree of interaction between ecosystem participants (Jacobides, Cennamo, & 
Gawer, 2018), this can be a tricky process for firms such as large MNEs with a variety of 
stakeholders - through complementary partnerships, client relationships with long histories, key 
positions with regulators, investors who have invested in the firm’s past performance and future 
expectations built thereupon, and so on. Scholars studying how incumbent firms respond to 
threatening innovations elsewhere in their ecosystems (e.g. Ansari, Garud, & Kumaraswamy, 
2016; Bitektine, Hill, Song, & Vandenberghe, 2020; Khanagha, Ansari, Paroutis, & Oviedo, 
2020) have pointed out that while technological advancements within firms are important for 
ensuring their survival in the face of disruptive innovations, the perceived ​legitimacy​ of those 
innovations as well as the firms and individuals pushing them forward are necessary for their 
adoption.  
External judgments are consequential for how innovating teams within firms can feasibly 
implement responsive strategies going forward. Recent work on legitimacy-building for a new 
firm in a nascent industry (e.g. Zuzul & Edmondson, 2017) identify the interrelationship between 
the firm’s external successes and its internal failures as predictive of legitimacy-building success.  
Indeed, research in nascent industries has theorized the importance of this task, 
typically described as one of ​legitimacy building​ (e.g., Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; 
Navis & Glynn, 2010; Wry et al., 2011). Scholars have described how firms in 




(Zuzul & Edmondson, 2017: 304) 
Recent empirical work further helps us understand how legitimacy correlates with the nature of 
the new offering in question (Zhao, Fisher, Lounsbury, & Miller, 2017) and the importance of 
narratives and rhetoric in legitimacy-building to outside parties (Garud, Gehman, & Giuliani, 
2014; Patala, Korpivaara, Jalkala, Kuitunen, & Soppe, 2019).  
Furthermore, we have notable works concerning extraordinary cases of 
legitimacy-building in unlikely settings, such as that of Uber’s rise (Garud, Kumaraswamy, 
Roberts, & Xu, 2020). Yet, what is missing is a close look at how managers balance legitimacy 
campaigns to external ​as well as internal​ stakeholders, especially when exploring ventures with 
no precedent and past performance from which these stakeholders can make quick judgments of 
institutional alignment. Thus, the question we pose is ​how do managers legitimize their 
innovation strategies to internal and external stakeholders?  
Drawing on institutional theory (e.g. Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 1995) and 
ecosystems literature (e.g. Jacobides et al., 2018), our case study findings offer several 
contributions to the broadening understanding of legitimacy and the process of legitimization in 
nascent or transforming ecosystems. Through following an operative team’s actions in deciding 
how to address their firm’s legitimacy challenges, establishing bifurcated strategies to enlist the 
support of internal and external stakeholders, and adjusting their legitimacy management 
practices over time, we illustrate how discourses concerning value capture in one direction and 
those concerning value creation in another direction diverge. We then discuss how they are 
received by various stakeholders and highlight some of the pitfalls the actors we study 
encountered, which is an important inclusion to counterbalance the rose-tinted narratives that 




by showcasing a novel dynamic: that when ventures are legitimized to internal stakeholders with 
valuable resources necessary for the venture’s functionality, this gives ventures the capability of 
legitimacy accumulation with external stakeholders who then support the venture’s value 
creation, in turn satisfying internal stakeholders’ expectations for value capture. These 
stakeholders might then be encouraged to dedicate further resources to the venture, lending it 
further capabilities, further increasing the venture’s value creation potential, and so on. This 
nearly self-sustaining cycle can be an attractive one for practitioners seeking out such a position 
in an innovation ecosystem, as well as for scholars probing for a further understanding of 
interfirm collaboration in innovative settings.  
In terms of academic contribution, we firstly put forth an understanding of how value 
capture and value creation strategies are created and related to stakeholders who do not have a 
substantive performance history to look at when considering whether to support or reject 
ventures. This emphasizes the importance of stakeholders in literature concerning value capture 
and creation in ecosystems (e.g. Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Ceccagnoli, Forman, Huang, & Wu, 
2012; Cennamo & Santaló, 2019). While this provides valuable insight in and of itself, it further 
speaks to the heterogeneity of internal and external stakeholders, whereby we offer another 
contribution: theoretical insight on how managers must engage in separate discourses 
concurrently for both types to garner support for their ventures. 
Secondly and to extend on work concerning the importance of rhetoric and narratives in 
responding to institutional expectations concerning firms (e.g. Garud, Gehman, et al., 2014; 
Garud, Schildt, & Lant, 2014; Kuratko, Fisher, Bloodgood, & Hornsby, 2017; Patala et al., 
2019), the process we reveal shows that managers must sometimes engage in legitimacy-building 




presently, so that they may receive support required to actualize those future states. This means 
that some strategies are action-based, and others - future-state ones - are symbolic. Our focus on 
the orchestrator role is especially instrumental in introducing the importance of ambidexterity or 
simultaneity in doing so. We further highlight how a successful legitimacy-building campaign 
provides for a future drawing-together of these actual and symbolic strategies that appeases the 
motives of internal stakeholders, external stakeholders, and the orchestrator negotiating with 
them separately. 
Thirdly, looking through a process lens at the stakeholder-responsive strategies of 
individual actors in innovative ecosystem collaboration yields valuable insights on changes in 
strategic states for process research concerned with the link of micro to macro (e.g. Kouamé & 
Langley, 2018; Paquin & Howard-Grenville, 2013).  Legitimacy processes are context- and 
time-dependent; thus the strategies actors engage in to build legitimacy are at the mercy of the 
constantly shifting technological and institutional landscapes. Our submission of this actor-level 
view is necessary for a better, processual understanding of the legitimacy-building dynamics at 
play in nascent or transforming ecosystems.  
In the following section, we will discuss where notable dialogues concerning legitimacy 
have led our field, interspersed with how these pertain to a firm in an orchestrating position and 
the issues it could face. Following that, we will introduce our research site, the data we collected 
therefrom, and our analytical steps. Finally, our findings and discussion section will conclude 






As scholars have argued for some time (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Deephouse, Bundy, 
Tost, & Suchman, 2017; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 1995), 
institutions and the patterns they encourage persist even through large-scale change. A 
manifestation of this is legitimacy and its process form, legitimization. Legitimacy in this paper 
uses Deephouse et al.’s (2017: 32) definition: “the perceived appropriateness of an organization 
to a social system in terms of rules, values, norms, and definitions.” Legitimacy and 
legitimization activities can occur at various levels: within firms, between firms, and between 
fields of firms (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006). In our study, we focus on the former two since the 
actions of individuals are most apparent at and within the boundaries of firms. Furthermore, as 
the rules, norms, and so on applicable in a highly technological ecosystem generally follow the 
progress of technological innovation, legitimacy criteria as they pertain to such can change over 
time and the ways for a firm to achieve, maintain, and manage legitimacy change over time as 
well.  
However and somewhat puzzlingly, firms also run the risk of over-conforming at which 
point they may blur the lines that delineate their offerings from those of their competitors (Zhao 
et al., 2017). This can be especially damaging, as external stakeholders might not be able to then 
coherently discern the legitimacy (or lack thereof) of one firm apart from the next (Durand & 
Kremp, 2016; Kim & Jensen, 2011; Martens, Jennings, & Jennings, 2007). For internal 
stakeholders, this could affect whether they will choose to support the proposed actions by, for 
instance, lending resources under their control - an unlikely outcome if these stakeholders see the 




legitimacy rejection, forcing them to walk a tightrope that Zhao et al. (2017) term optimal 
distinctiveness. The risks with internal stakeholders might be even more severe in this direction, 
as they might be inclined to distance themselves from initiatives that clearly depart from 
managerial expectations - as could easily be the case for ventures exploring entirely new 
ecosystems or seeking to create offerings with no precedent in the firm. An incumbent 
purposefully seeking a position among these firms that is somewhat reliant on their offerings’ 
client attractiveness must walk this same tightrope. The novelty of fintechs as participants in the 
financial services ecosystem bring these legitimacy challenges to the surface. In this context, we 
additionally answer Zhao et al.’s (2017) call for research that views firms’ strategic balancing as 
dynamic rather than fixed through time, and as we will highlight empirically in the findings 
section, complications such as technological bottlenecking (Masucci, Brusoni, & Cennamo, 
2020) can arise. 
The efforts a firm must undertake to achieve legitimacy may similarly come with 
trade-offs. Lee, Hiatt, and Lounsbury (2017) find that organizations could leverage those 
trade-offs to achieve cognitive legitimacy in an ecosystem. Cognitive legitimacy occurs when an 
organization’s venture or methods become institutionalized within the ecosystem (Aldrich & 
Ruef, 2006) and become taken for granted by key stakeholders (Suchman, 1995), such that these 
stakeholders are aware of and understand their activities (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). One way to 
build cognitive legitimacy is “by creating a knowledge base in their own organization” (Aldrich 
& Ruef, 2006: 186). This is crucial for conveying the legitimacy of the firm’s actions to external 
stakeholders - essentially showing that the firm and its actors know what they are doing - but this 
is also a very important step for enlisting internal stakeholders as well. Firms oftentimes employ 




as others to discuss ongoing and future exploratory projects.  
It is important to remember that these ventures “do not substantively pre-exist 
themselves, except and only in terms of the imaginings, expectations and visions that have 
shaped their potential” (Borup, Brown, Konrad, & Van Lente, 2006: 285). Relating to Bitektine, 
Hill, and Song’s (2020) delineation of reputation versus legitimacy - detailed in a moment - past 
performance in a proposed operation cannot be showcased to these audiences and rhetorical 
strategies must adjust accordingly. Garud, Schildt, and Lant (2014), extending on this, argue that 
an entrepreneur who communicates the narrative of his or her venture’s future runs the risk of 
losing legitimacy prior to a stakeholder’s onboarding, due to a perceived overselling of the 
venture; or losing legitimacy after the stakeholder’s onboarding, due to disappointments in actual 
performance.  
For a large firm with a long history, its past legitimacy in other fields may be 
compromised by new entrants and falling-out of old partners; therefore, it must contend for 
legitimacy alongside startups, though admittedly with greater reserves of reputation and capital. 
Bitektine and colleagues (2020) discuss the interrelatedness of reputation and legitimacy, and 
while this is not the core focus of this paper, it is worth clarifying here. They assert that the 
differentiating factor is that the former concerns future expectations based on past actions and 
sometimes alongside the esteem of a firm compared to others of its group (Deephouse & Carter, 
2005), whereas the latter concerns acceptability within a living socially constructed framework. 
We focus on legitimacy herein, but Atos’ positive reputation among its clients contextualizes 





An important aspect of ecosystem orchestration as a legimization strategy is that 
incumbents can explore for innovative purposes without outright risking their own 
aforementioned legitimacy, upon which they rely to uphold their reputation and trust (Bitektine 
et al., 2020). Previous research of these approaches include the use of outbound open innovation 
strategies (Masucci et al., 2020) and experimental spaces (Cartel, Boxenbaum, & Aggeri, 2019). 
These approaches are valuable for incumbent firms that have ample resources and time to 
ambidextrously create and explore their own solutions to innovation demands.  
To tie legitimacy into orchestration, recall that as orchestrating firms build their 
collaborative offerings in an attempt to assert a critical position for themselves, they need to 
gather a series of complementors to whom they must convey that what they are doing is 
legitimate. These terms and dynamics are highly similar to platform ecosystems, where recent 
literature has shown that the steps towards accumulating legitimacy with external stakeholders 
are slippery (Khanagha et al., 2020; Ozalp & Cennamo, 2017). As ecosystems lack hierarchical 
governance (Jacobides et al., 2018; Shipilov & Gawer, 2019), participants must conform to 
socially constructed norms to achieve legitimacy and, as mentioned previously, these norms can 
change over time.  
For internal stakeholders, this strategy might be an attractive risk buffer. On the other 
side, the orchestrator is an interesting point of focus from a value capture point of view because 
the orchestrator identifies firms within said set whose offerings, when combined, can create a 
new offering of ostensibly increased value (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006). Of course, these values 
and configurations of firms must adapt to the evolving meaning of legitimacy, necessitating a 




orchestrated components.  
An interesting qualitative study of (network) orchestration is that of Paquin and 
Howard-Grenville (2013). In this study, an organization embedded in an industrial ecosystem 
sought to orchestrate a network of various other ecosystem participants, and their longitudinal 
examination showcased three major phases and dilemmas the organization encountered while 
doing so. These phases and dilemmas were the construction of its network from discordant parts, 
with the dilemma being how to canvas a diverse array of audiences; the leveraging of said 
network for innovative purposes, with the dilemma being whether to allow network participants 
to coalesce by chance and seize their inherent innovative potential or to (perhaps overly) control 
said encounters and assume superior knowledge of their capabilities; and the growth of the 
network, with the dilemma being how to strategically balance between network advancement 
and network utilization - similar to the question of optimal ambidexterity in inter-firm 
partnerships (Aoki & Wilhelm, 2017; Luger, Raisch, & Schimmer, 2018). This study focuses on 
a network of firms orchestrated by one entity. Our research focuses on the financial services 
ecosystem, but even within that, we focus on a hub firm that builds networks of other firms in the 
ecosystem for innovative, and thereby competitive, purposes. Paquin and Howard-Grenville’s 
study then provides interesting conclusions that are relevant here: notably, the learning of how to 
efficiently build such a network is crucial in highly innovative settings, and in this, there is a risk 
of “over-engineering” (2013: 1648) that process, thereby constricting the network’s potential or 
“bottlenecking” technological innovation (Masucci et al., 2020). 
Relatedly, Fisher and colleagues (2016) consider legitimacy in entrepreneurial settings 
and specifically how it must be managed across stakeholders, their perspectives, and time in 




of usefulness for legitimacy, where surpassing it can give an organization trouble in its next life 
cycle stage as onlookers essentially lock it in to institutions conformed to in the previous one. A 
major component of our paper is an embedded program that takes on its own life cycle; we see a 
similar phenomenon therein and comment on it accordingly.  
Following Milliken’s (1987) definition of ​effect uncertainty​, where individuals within a 
firm cannot reliably predict how ecosystemic or super-ecosystemic changes will affect their firm, 
we investigate the financial services ecosystem as changing and the ecosystem of fintechs within 
it as nascent and growing significantly. The broader financial services ecosystem’s new entrants 
(whether fintechs, orchestrators, or otherwise) and incumbent participants are not immune to 
these forces and there seems to be a general understanding that collaboration buffers against 
them (Navaretti, Calzolari, Mansilla-Fernandez, & Pozzolo, 2017). However, the story we will 
soon tell strongly relies on questions of whether value can be captured and created reliably, and 
that these questions come from internal and external stakeholders and necessitate a long 
campaign of action to answer suggests that this is still a strong force with which actors in the 
ecosystem are constantly negotiating. 
Research Site 
This research project involves close collaboration with an incumbent firm, Atos, and 
specifically its Alpha Team industry directors, the core team in charge of handling financial 
service client accounts as well as Atos’ engagement with fintechs. Atos has a long history in the 
ecosystem and, in the modern age, has typically offered IT and digital transformation (Verhoef et 
al., 2021) solutions to firms in various ecosystems - financial services included. However, it is 
currently undergoing a large-scale verticalization to broaden the solutions it can offer, thus 




Additionally, we worked closely with the founders of TechQuartier (at times notated as 
TQ), a startup incubator in Frankfurt, Germany with a strong fintech presence. Atos developed a 
partnership with this incubator for reasons we will explain in our findings, but it became an 
important space for observational data collection. This hub is a gateway to many dozens of 
fintechs, and the collection of them form a network managed by the founders. This management 
involves the control of entry as well as orchestration of collaborative ties, but the fintechs are 
also free to build their own partnerships. The orchestration as it takes place in TechQuartier can 
happen for a variety of ends: the founders are occasionally approached by outside parties in 
search of a chained solution that the founders know, through their deep knowledge of the 
TechQuartier community, can be orchestrated amidst it; the founders may be requested to 
orchestrate by a sponsor - which Atos currently is - for that sponsor’s own needs; or the founders 
may orchestrate fintech-fintech partnerships purely for the benefit of the fintechs. This 
elaboration is not central to the research question herein but serves instead to show the potential 
value that the TechQuartier partnership has for Atos. 
Convincing the TechQuartier founders of Atos’ legitimacy is its key to accessing the 
fintechs that populate the hub’s space. Though this control point is not all-encompassing, as tools 
like LinkedIn allow the circumvention of such a barrier, it is still with Atos’ interests to present 
itself as a legitimate partner to the hub and, by extension, a legitimate potential partner for the 
fintechs. Doing so, as a condition of the sponsorship, gives Atos the opportunity to host 
networking events within TechQuartier’s physical space. A few of these events have been critical 
to our data collection, as they have allowed us to engage in participant and unobtrusive 





Data collection for this research began in August 2019. Our primary window into the 
firm was through Alpha Team’s industry directors. The directors typically have between 10 and 
20 years of industry experience, and are specialized in various fields related to finance: 
insurance, compliance, finance technology, et cetera. They are assigned stewardship over the 
accounts of the firm’s largest clients, such as well-known banks, payment providers, and the like. 
With their specializations and the clout that comes from having close ties with large players in 
financial ecosystems, the directors are major actors in the research site, entrusted by their 
organization with a fair amount of autonomy to act on behalf of their organization within the 
ecosystem. These directors have made a concerted effort to build strong ties to the ecosystem of 
fintechs that has blossomed over the past six years in order to gain an understanding of and 
provide innovative solutions to their clients’ needs. 
We have so far conducted fourteen semi-structured interviews with seven mid- to 
top-level directors, two of whom have moved on to other companies since. These interviews 
range from 18 to 53 minutes. Some are recorded and transcribed, and others were rigorously 
notated, depending on interviewee preference. We intend to continue interviewing these 
informants until we have achieved theoretical saturation and no more new, significant data arise. 
Augmenting interview data are notes from sitting in weekly strategy meetings among the Alpha 
Team directorate. We have notated these meetings for relevant themes since August 2019 and 
will continue to do so through this paper’s submission. Additionally, we have made use of 
various reports and regulatory documents from European institutions engaged in and overseeing 
the financial services ecosystem that we investigate.  





As this research is a qualitative investigation of a series of phenomena concerning a 
socially constructed concept, this is a subjectivist-constructivist process study. Close contact 
with actors in the field means capturing their narratives, both historical and ongoing, as they 
experience ecosystemic change and the challenges endemic to legitimization. Capturing these 
processes as experienced (Garud, Berends, & Tuertscher, 2018) involves a series of interviews 
with actors in the firm, those who assess their legitimization efforts as external stakeholders, and 
non-partisan observers who provide triangulating perspectives. At each step, the dialogues that 
happen between actors within the firm and those who observe them - the researcher included - 
form co-created ideas of the firm’s collective legitimacy. Engaging in ethnographic methods as 
the actors engage in relevant legitimization activities will shed light on the peripheral activities 
necessary to answer how managers legitimize their innovation activities to various stakeholders. 
As laid out, process is an inevitable instrument of this investigation. Organization 
scholars (Langley, 2007; Van de Ven & Poole, 2005) have followed Heraclitus, Democritus, and 
Whitehead (1929) among others in establishing a weak and strong process view for organization 
studies . We use a weak process view in this study, where organizations are more or less stably 
identifiable across time. Process, then, comprises the multiplicity of interactions between them 
that are necessary for them to remain in action (Langley, 2007). The alternative strong process 
view, which could elicit its own interesting conclusions, views organizations as constellations of 
processes without a strict delineation between processes and the entities that are subject to them 
(Langley, 2007). This would overcomplicate the phenomena we examine here, but could be a 
promising angle for future research on, for example, understanding the depths of entanglement 




Therefore, with a weak process view in mind, a useful starting point in this research is a 
historical and retrospective account by actors of what existed prior to the large-scale ecosystemic 
change. This research began inductively and the first 11 interviews primarily helped in building a 
picture of a firm experiencing change but not yet clearly understanding what, exactly, it was 
experiencing within that change - nor what it was responding with. We recorded these 
interviews, transcribed them, and coded them in Nvivo as is the protocol for all subsequent 
interviews. For these particular interviews, we coded them thematically whereas for the next 
stage of interviews, we code along lines of incidents and events (Poole, Lambert, Murase, & 
Asencio, 2016). As the project has evolved, these initial interviews and the thematic codes 
elicited from them have proven useful in providing cultural insights as well as discordant 
accounts of what the firm’s priorities are at various stages of ecosystemic change. The various 
reports and other regulatory documents we collected along the way allowed us to corroborate our 
findings via content analysis (Duriau, Reger, & Pfarrer, 2007). 
Findings and Discussion 
The European financial services ecosystem has mostly been dominated by a relatively 
small group of powerful firms, many of them national flagships such as ING (from The 
Netherlands) and Deutsche Bank (from Germany). The sheer size and status of these firms gives 
them significant institutional clout and could, for a while, blockade the disruption of their control 
over consumer financial data. At a certain point, however, technological and especially 
data-centric developments in the financial services industry advanced far enough that they 
escaped jurisdiction laid out in the original Payment Services Directive - advised by banking 
institutions - laid out by the European Commision in 2007. This and the “legal uncertainty, 




(European Commission, 2016) dictated action at the governmental level and the European 
Commission updated its inaugural directive with PSD2, writing into law that these incumbent 
firms - most notably banks - ​must​ share consumer data with third party service providers with the 
consent of the respective consumer. Diffusing data under a regulatory scope watered down the 
incumbents’ hegemony while giving regulators greater oversight to ensure greater compliance 
and fraud prevention. This is a notable change in the ecosystem’s ​sociopolitical legitimacy 
(Aldrich & Ruef, 2006; Deephouse et al., 2017), to the extent that if even a powerful incumbent 
unbudgingly maintained its previous course of action, this would be a ​de facto​ refusal to comply​1 
and would stand a great chance of jeopardizing  the incumbent’s legitimacy.  
Customer data is a highly valuable asset for banks (Sorrentino, 2020). It gives them the 
opportunity to examine customer spending habits, run non-invasive risk assessments, and 
generally get close to their customers. To now be directed to open those databanks to the surging 
population of fintechs likely meant to many bank strategists a severe loss of control over their 
customer relationships. It was not strategically sound to sit idly by while fintechs seized  new 
innovation opportunities.  It was well within the interests of these incumbent firms to 
competitively innovate.  
Many did. As the European Banking Authority, or EBA (2018: 29) reported, there was at 
the time a “growing focus on the R&D of new and emerging technologies,” with most of that 
“usually conducted through internal accelerators.” Other incumbents engaged in an open 
innovation (Masucci et al., 2020) type of approach that we referenced previously, but “alliance 
with peer institutions is not an easy task within the financial services sector, given its highly 
competitive nature ” (EBA, 2018: 29). The EBA concluded that “the predominant way of 




interacting with [fintechs] is through partnerships with new entrant [fintech] firms and other 
firms that aim to actively follow and embrace [fintech] developments” (2018: 25). 
Engaging in these partnerships directly is a risky business, however. As of yet, there is no 
concise figure for the failure rate of fintechs which is likely due to the fact that boundaries for 
what constitutes a fintech proper are not entirely clear, as can be seen by any cursory Internet 
search of the term, and therefore establishing boundary conditions to any such analysis would be 
dependent on any one non-universal definition. However, if many or most fintechs are startups or 
scaleups as we consider them in this paper, they are plagued with challenges we see in research 
concerning novel firms: challenges inherent to experimenting with new organizational forms as 
part of their operating model (Tracey, Dalpiaz, & Phillips, 2018), the possibility of failure to 
diffuse their offerings through the ecosystem (Kuratko et al., 2017), trouble successfully 
legitimizing their narratives (Fisher, Kuratko, Bloodgood, & Hornsby, 2017) which could be 
especially foreboding in the highly institutional financial services ecosystem, and so forth.  
Premise. 
Meanwhile, Atos - already providing a variety of necessary IT solutions for many 
incumbent firms in the financial services ecosystem and therefore very much a member of this 
ecosystem for its high entanglement - was not in an optimal position to do much about the 
fintech wave sweeping over its clients. On one hand, this is due to having been overdue for a 
verticalization of their prior industry-specific set of offerings. “Atos has been somewhat lagging. 
So most of their competitors have verticalized in the past, and continue to be so today. So in that 
sense, Atos is a follower, not a leader” (Interview with a senior-level analyst in a research firm, 
October 2020). Verticalization in this sense means being able to offer clients the entirety of a 




verticalized service-provider essentially a one-stop shop and eliminates the need for the clients 
themselves to go to several different service providers and piecemeal together their own mobile 
banking solution, for instance. “So far, the strategy of [Atos] has been to invest in the important 
assets of tomorrow in terms of [specifically] IT… which is a very different approach from what 
our competitors have… like Accenture” (interview with an Atos industry director, December 
2019).  
Putting this strategic approach next to Atos’ acquisition history starts to paint a troubling 
picture, especially in terms of how acquisition costs can affect a firm’s ability to bring fresh 
talent in.  
If you see the trend in Atos, we have acquired a lot of companies. And with these 
acquisitions, we have also acquired a lot of people who were not exactly in the 
early years of their careers. So even when we are taking over businesses… we are 
taking people who are quite old. So we are building our own legacy situation. And 
the pace of hiring new talent has been very very slow. Why? Because we’ve been 
in an environment which is a cost-cutting environment.”​ ​(Alpha Team industry 
director, December 2019) 
 
The high mean age of a given workforce might usually be a nonfactor, but as this 
informant indicates (and as the leader of the team and the first author of this paper discussed in 
informal chats), Atos wanted to convey the idea to clients that it could be an origin point for 
innovative digital transformation, but an enduring lack of fresh talent was inhibiting that at a 
fundamental level. A heuristic needed to be found - quickly. 
Leaders in Alpha Team saw this as early as 2014. At that time, Alpha Team was mostly 
engaged in providing horizontal solutions for large-scale clients. This meant that the contracts 
per client were for large sums of money, but the services Atos provided to one client were not 




solutions time- and resource-intensive. One manager on this team experimented with the idea of 
creating more modular solutions that required less tailoring between clients. Even if each 
solution’s revenue returned were more modest, his assumption was that the lower cost of 
production per solution sold would maximize gross profit. Notably, this was at odds with the 
institutionally derived standard for contract-based revenue generation.  
However, Atos needed to make up for time and organic innovation lost in following a 
horizontal path, and potential partnerships with a new type of financial service providers, the 
rising popularity of which at the time was unavoidable, seemed to be an answer. 
The concept is very simple: we have the scale in sales capacity, [fintechs] have 
the technology and are very smart and know how to do this, we can scale 
[offerings] also on technology. (Alpha Team lead, December 2019) 
 
The hope was that by creating working partnerships with, and orchestrating the functions of, 
fintechs who specialized in a specific financial technology, Atos could bypass the high cost of 
organically created digital solutions for its clients.  On the outward-facing side, this narrative 
could be cast in a light that appeases all manner of risk mitigation strategies: Atos could provide 
clients with the advantageous solutions of fintechs alongside the services Atos clients already 
knew and trusted, while at the same time functioning as a screener for the risks that come with 
close partnerships. An orchestrator was born. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Figure 1 shows the triphasic process that follows from this point. In the subsequent 
subsections, we will discuss each in further detail. A concise summary is as follows: actors in the 
core team of our focus understood the nature of their MNE to be one where enlisting support 




the image that such a system already existed. Thus and as indicated in the first phase, they opted 
to simultaneously campaign to internal stakeholders using a mock-up of the system while also 
beginning discourses with external parties in manners that implied such a system was already 
operational. These bifurcated efforts, indicated in the second phase, gained traction with internal 
stakeholders such that they received the necessary support to stand up the firm’s capability to 
systematically orchestrate fintech offerings alongside their own, and while they also gained 
traction with external stakeholders such as a key partnered startup incubator and clients, the 
reception from fintechs was lukewarm. However, and as indicated in the third phase, these 
efforts enabled an easier development of future projects reliant on the orchestrated architecture. 
Phase 1: Laying an orchestration foundation, getting ahead of legitimacy issues. 
At the beginning, significant intra-firm entrepreneurship was required to secure enough 
resources to build the capability to integrate fintech solutions into Atos’ total set of offerings. 
This section describes the initial conditions actors were facing as well as the coming together of 
a more systematic orchestration strategy. We will begin with our analyses of the legitimacy push 
to enlist internal stakeholders and will follow that with the tactics used to recruit external 
stakeholder support.  
I always start outside-in, right, so brochures, website, the whole thing and then I 
build all the internal stuff because you need to create a kind of perception in 
order to make [stakeholders in the company] believe that it’s there, right, and 
then I went to the different divisions and my manager… basically saying ‘this is 
what’s happening in the market, this is the addressable market, this is what we 
want to do, this is what we need from you, and this is going to be the [return on 
investment] for your department.’... That’s the story we pitched, and all of them 
bought in, so we got the 4 million... (Alpha Team lead, December 2019) 
 
The different stakeholders this informant refers to are ones needed to technically pull off such an 




fintech software with Atos’ own software, cybersecurity specialists who would need to protect 
the firm’s cybersecurity reputation from potentially harmful vulnerabilities in the partner 
fintechs’ systems, and so on - as well as more social stakeholders such as marketing, legal, and 
communications teams. There is an interesting theoretical significance in this order of actions, 
especially for actors within large, discordant firms who are seeking to pioneer an orchestration 
activity. The rise in stakeholders of an orchestration activity comes with a more intense variety 
of stakeholder institutions with which to align; in other words, “different legitimacy sources have 
different criteria that [might] sometimes conflict (Fisher et al., 2016; Ruef & Scott, 1998)” 
(Deephouse et al., 2017: 39). To deconflict, actors may need to tell a variety of narratives in a 
variety of stages to enact certain processes in time for subsequent, dependent ones to take shape. 
A concurrent discussion with internal stakeholders concerned how to capture value in the 
proposed orchestration strategy. The answer proffered by the core team’s leadership involved 
adjusting how, in a practical sense, Atos was to generate revenue going forward.  
In 2014, I was part of… an executive leadership program… and in the end you 
need to make a strategic [proposal] to a board in Atos, and I was allocated a 
couple of people, maybe five or six, to do a study, make a recommendation. There, 
I thought hey, I could build incremental revenues for Atos if I set up a program to 
work… big Atos with smaller parties. (Alpha Team lead, December 2019) 
 
Up until this point, this team had generated revenue by servicing time-consuming contracts 
where the offerings between clients were not necessarily modular or, in another sense, 
modularity of the offerings was secondary to servicing each contract. This informant indicates 
that the opportunity cost of working on each contract in such a time-consuming manner could be 
substituted with a more modular approach for more total revenue per contract and, we assume, 




analogies to such.  
A key feature of this approach that seems to have been understated in the data we 
collected is that this also protects revenues via diversification of sources. In other words, the risk 
of one deal falling through and thus wiping out a significant fraction of revenue is mitigated by 
dispersing offerings among several deals, each providing a comparatively smaller dividend of the 
team’s total revenue. This combined with various other internal mechanisms that were 
implemented into the system at or near its inauguration, such as committing to hold onboarded 
fintechs’ IPs in escrow in case of their failure and establishing a standardized due diligence 
check for each potential new fintech, addressed the risk concerns of prudent institutions 
governing the team - a key step to legitimization in this realm. 
The question that naturally follows is how this comparatively higher value captured could 
be dispersed among internal stakeholders. After all, Atos, like many MNEs, comprises several 
different units, each with their own particular missions, key performance indicators, and 
institutions governing their expectations and activities. We gleaned useful answers to this 
question in the previously cited interview with the core team lead, but perhaps a more telling 
source of answers are the strategy meetings the first author sat in on. Invites to these meetings, 
hosted by the core team, were often sent out to key personnel of other units within Atos for 
various reasons: to present a mission profile of their unit for general knowledge, to pitch a 
project proposal that might involve the core team’s resources, and so on.  
What became apparent over time was that the core team was, through its orchestration 
efforts, pushing for wider visibility throughout the firm. This coincided with a CEO change as 
well as the previously mentioned verticalization of the company, which, if not proactively 




landscape. What we gleaned from several of these meetings, then, and witnessing the offering of 
the core team’s services to (potentially) complementary units in the firm is the idea of an implicit 
expectation of returned support. In other words, the core team invited strategically significant 
actors from other units and seemed to make their services - some of which would be 
substantiated by the orchestration in process - available for these units, but a recurrent notion was 
that this could only be done if those units supported the initial orchestration effort. Thus, the 
need to actualize a mock-up of the system was crucial to enlisting this support and thus we 
include this as a legitimization step here.  
The third legitimization strategy for internal stakeholders we took note of in an 
autoethnographic sense is the partnership with parties assumed to be legitimate, such as 
universities. We were initially hesitant to include this for not wanting to feature ourselves in the 
story, but it must be known that Atos has its own knowledge-creation body, termed the Scientific 
Community, which we will discuss further later in this section. The Scientific Community is a 
highly respected body within the firm and it became evident over time that vetting strategic 
ideas, such as that engaging head-on with fintechs could be a profitable future for the company, 
through the Scientific Community carries a lot of weight when trying to implement subsequent, 
related business endeavors, such as building the means to industrialize an orchestration of fintech 
offerings and integration of them into Atos offerings.  
It also must be known, however, that the Scientific Community is not an independent 
research agency, and the pitfalls of a scientific body being subordinate to a for-profit company 
seem to be known to its members. We included this section, then, after witnessing how the 
partnership with this university project was brandished as a legitimizing tool towards members 




that the nature of the endeavor itself was legitimized by an outside, independent agency. 
External stakeholders - such as the fintechs that the core team intended to have in the 
orchestration system - have significantly less of a stake in Atos’ success, as their offerings could 
just as easily be incorporated in any other firm’s system with presumably the same or similar 
potential for returns. In a sense, these stakeholders had to be wooed with more firepower. The 
core team, understanding this, embarked on a multi-year campaign to make their presence known 
throughout the budding fintech ecosystem, with a regional European emphasis.  
In 2016, TechQuartier, the previously mentioned fintech-heavy startup incubator based in 
continental Europe’s financial capital, was established. At about the same time, Atos committed 
an annual sum of €50,000 to a type of TechQuartier sponsorship package that gave Atos certain 
access to the working space in which starting and scaling fintechs were collaborating and 
figuring out their business models and offerings, as well as the ability to host up to two events 
per year in that same space (interviews with several Atos personnel, September through 
December 2019). This gave the core team an opportunity to leverage Atos’ extant legitimacy by 
way of hosting knowledge-sharing events such as the Compliance Navigator. This event 
responded to the assumption that many fintechs were, of their own accord, intending to scale 
their offerings globally without being experts on the regulations that they would incidentally fall 
under in doing so.  
… fintechs usually want to approach the global market, but if you want to collect 
data of over 50,000 Canadians, even if you’re in Germany, you immediately fall 
under the jurisdiction of the Canadian government, and a lot of the fintechs don’t 
think that way. (Alpha Team industry director, November 2020) 
 
Naturally, rubbing elbows with the exact group the team wanted to populate its budding 




signal to the fintechs that it was willing and eager to work with them. We include this as an 
important legitimacy tactic in a discursive space, especially when we consider what the 
alternative could be. Consider, for instance, that a more stereotypical startup entrepreneur might 
have to dedicate significant effort to finding her- or himself face-to-face with actors from an 
MNE who ​might​ be willing to engage in some kind of lucrative partnership. In this case, 
however, the MNE has flipped the script and committed effort as well as resources - personnel 
and the €50,000 sum per annum - to be at the fintechs’ front door. We consider this a 
legitimizing strategy specifically because Atos was certainly not the only firm to have done this; 
in fact, several other firms, from the local Frankfurt football club to IBM, did the same - some at 
a much greater cost than €50,000. This indicates to us that the script-flipping strategy is 
generally perceived​ to be not only appropriate, but effective as well.  
As a component to this, we included diversity and inclusion displays as a legitimization 
strategy. The notable events that highlighted the importance of this were the two Female Fintech 
Competitions that Atos led in the TechQuartier space during our data collection phase, wherein 
women-led fintechs were pitched and evaluated by a panel of various industry experts for merit 
and business viability. This step, however, can easily backfire if not followed through and as a 
legitimization strategy agnostic of the research site, we cannot understate that enough. Two 
separate interviews with entrepreneurs from two separate fintechs featured in one of these 
competitions suggested that this might have been an initiative powered more by zeitgeist than 
anything else, due to a perception from both that communications with Atos fell off behind 
closed doors.  
Phase 2: Legitimacy accumulation. 




model as “signaling” to represent that the outbound initiatives do not at launch take into account 
how they are received) is followed by a drawn out enlistment of internal and external 
stakeholders’ support. In this section, we will first discuss the consequences of accumulating 
legitimacy with internal stakeholders followed by those with external stakeholders. 
The alignment of internal stakeholder resources was contingent upon these stakeholders’ 
belief that the value capture opportunities that the core team conveyed were feasible. In some 
cases, this was done because the commitment of resources could turn around and net these 
stakeholders an easy return. For instance, enlisting the marketing department’s support was 
instrumental in advancing the orchestration narrative to broader audiences than the core team 
alone could achieve. 
… for them it’s all about lead generation… So if some of their campaigns… 
[lead] to a lead or opportunity, that’s good for them because they can sign the 
lead to their contribution in the sales force, right, so the opportunities then to act 
came via marketing. That’s not ever fully the case, because always then another 
person from my team is involved, or the sales team, et cetera. It’s more a 
collaboration between people and creating the right circumstances with these 
people. But a campaign or an event could trigger a lead. (Alpha Team lead, 
December 2019) 
 
For other internal stakeholders, however, such as higher management charged with the 
authority and decision on whether or not to allocate more human resources to the core team at 
their request to broaden the team’s capabilities, this required much more. We know that the 
legitimacy campaigns in the first phase towards internal stakeholders were at least partially 
successful because, despite the previously mentioned verticalization of the company existing as 
some kind of threat to the team’s relevancy in the firm’s continually developing future, the team 
leader made several announcements in weekly strategy meetings of successful acquisitions of 




exclusively from other units within the firms, rather than being new, “off the street” hires. We do 
not have access to the dialogues concerning the circumstances of these individual hires, but we 
know that the creation of positions for them at least speaks to higher management’s belief that 
the team needed more biopower. Additionally, there seemed to be few legitimacy obstacles in the 
team’s campaign to secure more practical assets like software development, which we derive 
from the fact that the team had continued support from Atos’ Global Delivery Center, essentially 
its development powerhouse, in the form of a dedicated specialist there. 
For external stakeholders and for the reasons we led with in the last subsection, the 
picture gets muddier. For this section, fintechs are the primarily relevant group of external 
stakeholders, so we will mainly focus on them with a slight exception towards the end of this 
subsection. To begin, the actual foot-soldiers in charge of populating the orchestration system 
were the industry directors. As specialists in their respective industries, they were charged with 
researching and networking with fintechs that they would find useful in procuring offerings for 
the clients that they cater to. Since the purpose of creating this system as a response to the old 
form of revenue generation was modularity, the industry directors were then charged by the team 
leader with compiling these fintechs and their relevant metadata into a formal interface fo the 
orchestration system that became known as the Fintech Engagement Program. This program, 
which initially was an Excel spreadsheet but then was upgraded to a more tailored interface 
hosted by StartupFlow, was then meant to be accessible by all of the industry directors, who 
could access it to explore ways in which they could bundle complementary services into their 
own industry solutions using what had already been found by their peers, avoiding the need to 
pave new relationships with unknown contacts - a time-consuming endeavor.  




collections of entrepreneurs managing them) are agentic, and therefore what makes sense for 
them must be accounted for in this system. Recall as well that Atos’ previous mode of generating 
revenue structures until now involved long, intense contracts which take significant time - a very 
consequential resource for small, novel fintechs - to order out. To depart from that institutional 
revenue-generating method also means to depart from institutional practices that convene to 
create it:  
“I try to replace [bureaucratic] processes [with] some pragmatic business 
development. When a fintech comes to us, they don’t want to fill out one paper for 
the [non-disclosure agreement], one paper for the framework elements… What 
they want to do is work on opportunities. That’s how I try to keep them working 
with us; it’s for the business. Bringing opportunities to them, bringing exposure to 
our work clients, and so on.” (Alpha Team industry director, December 2019) 
 
From the fintechs’ point of view, this approach can be incredibly valuable for a few reasons. 
Notably, the time saved in getting client exposure can be diverted towards product and offering 
improvement. 
The fintechs want to work within Atos because they want to work sales, right? [If 
I, as a fintech,] don’t make any sales, I don’t survive… If I’m doing everything 
right, I'm really trying to develop a better experience which means I have a lot of 
software developers, which means who has the money to hire a lot of sales 
people? But if I have a partnership with Atos, even better if they’ve made an 
investment into me, then they’re pushing my product. (Senior analyst in an 
independent research firm, October 2020) 
 
This interviewee quickly points out the other side to this, though: 
And it’s not enough, right, so that type of a fintech, that’s what they say to Atos 
and they also say that to the next ten competitors of Atos. (Senior analyst in an 
independent research firm, October 2020) 
 
To relate to some concepts from the first phase as we examine the process of a maturing 




protocols necessitate and in order to show a continued eagerness to work directly with these 
fintechs, the core team integrates its offering into demo solutions, oftentimes alongside other 
functions. Functions in this case can be other fintechs’ offerings, or they can be capabilities that 
Atos itself provides. These demos serve as a way to prove to current and potential clients the 
value creation potential of the total solution, which intrinsically means a proof of the fintech’s 
proportionate value. A successful demo also shows clients the robustness of the solution offered, 
and according to one interviewee, this is especially important to more risk-averse clients. 
Deutsche Bank likes that you’ve done it before for another major bank before 
they’ll trust you, so particularly on innovative, new topics where it’s new 
solutions, potentially one driven by a startup or through a partnership or 
Google… it’s not something you can convince Deutsche Bank on. (Former Alpha 
Team industry director, January 2020) 
 
If the alignment of the fintech’s offering with Atos’ orchestration system is continually useful for 
client expectations, it can result in a state of legitimacy that goes beyond the bounds of 
piecemeal contract fulfillment.  
Either a stronger bond continues to improve, strengthening the bond as trust 
grows, and so this fintech will more often be chosen as a solution partner for 
more and more clients. [The] other result can be that if Atos and the fintech grow 
really close, an M&A is initiated. We’ve done this in the past with several 
fintechs. (Alpha Team industry director, April 2020) 
 
However, an important sentiment arose in interviews with two industry directors. That is 
that this is not a linearly scalable tactic, because the onus of researching new fintechs still rests 
with the industry directors - who are simultaneously busy as frontline responders to client 
demands. As one director put it, having a handful of fintechs with a track record of proven 
performance is preferable to having a litany of them, if just for the fact that maintaining 




adjust existing offers towards new client demands, to renegotiate terms of partnerships, and so 
on) is a continually time-consuming process.  
Phase 3: Orchestration maturity. 
By this point in the process, the core team has amassed the resources it required from 
internal stakeholders as well as the capabilities necessary to engineer comprehensive, 
orchestrated offerings from external stakeholders. Recalling that modularity was a key feature of 
this offering, other projects that originated outside of the need to provide baseline offerings but 
that could use the architecture of the products created by this process started to form.  
There is no value in being something like a fintech database… it doesn’t bring 
any value to our company; what we want is to grow, to help the company grow 
with this collaboration with fintechs. So for us, the number one KPI is sales. So if 
we want to be more efficient in terms of sales, we need to focus more… And the 
most important is that they also find value in the cooperation, otherwise they 
wouldn’t spend their scarce resources on this” (Alpha Team industry director, 
February 2020) 
 
As this industry director reflects, simply gaining the capability to orchestrate or components of 
an orchestration system does not do much by itself.  
In terms of value capture, internal stakeholders - those leveraging sales expectations on 
the core team, those relying on previously mentioned implications of returned support, and so on 
- relied on an idea of continued value creation. In terms of value creation, external stakeholders - 
mainly the fintechs who had lent their offerings to Atos’ orchestration system - relied on Atos’ 
continued value capture. We see this in several lateral projects that have sprung up with some 
componential point of origin residing in the system orchestrated in the above process. These are 
ongoing processes at the time of this paper’s submission, and as such there are confidentiality 




All the same, where the two types of stakeholders’ expectations meet and then cross to 
the point where they rely on each other’s continued support is perhaps the most satisfying part of 
this process, at least for the orchestrators. There is not a clearly identifiable point at which this 
happened, but it seems to have emerged some time in early 2020. Considering that the process 
began in 2016 to respond to an issue that emerged even earlier in 2014, the mutual understanding 
between stakeholders that finally allowed the orchestrators to move from legitimacy building to 
legitimacy management (Suchman, 1995) freed up time for the individual actors to tend to other 
projects or, as became increasingly relevant during the COVID-19 pandemic that erupted 
midway through our data collection process, adjust to major global events unrelated to their jobs. 
Conclusion 
Firms are in a constant search for valuable innovations, whether for survival or 
bunker-busting​2​. Managers, as the footsoldiers of these efforts, often seek collaboration with 
other ecosystem participants to jumpstart this process. The reality is that many of these 
collaborative endeavors fail to reach set objectives, with shifting landscapes and subsequent 
legitimacy concerns hampering their progress. In this paper, we investigate how actors within a 
firm engage in a bifurcated legitimacy campaign to coerce internal and external stakeholders into 
supporting an innovating orchestration system. Using ethnographic methods and interviews as 
well as drawing on legitimacy-specific institutional theory and ecosystem innovation literatures, 
we looked at the evolving motives, expectations, and legitimacy-building strategies actors in a 
keystone, orchestrating firm employ through a process lens to shed light on how these 
stakeholders can be made to work for each other. 
2 Bunker-busters are explosives, usually air-dropped bombs, specially engineered to destroy heavily 
fortified structures that are otherwise difficult to penetrate. This is an analog for new innovations that are specifically 




We discovered that actors on the core team initiating the intent to catch their firm up with 
its outpacing competitors had to woo internal stakeholders with the idea that its innovative 
orchestration was already underway and vetted by knowledgeable, outside agents, while 
simultaneously convincing the external stakeholders whose buy-in it needed to power the system 
that it would be a lucrative endeavor in which to participate. We thus add to literature streams 
concerning value creation in ecosystems (Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Ceccagnoli et al., 2012; 
Cennamo & Santaló, 2019) by shedding light on internal stakeholders as important actors to 
consider and removing the ​de facto​ assumption from these streams that firm managers who 
engage in novel ecosystem ventures can rely on ​ex ante​ internal stakeholder support. 
Where these discourses happened in a temporal sense relative to each other also places 
focus in a story of narratives (adding to Garud, Gehman, et al., 2014; Garud, Schildt, et al., 2014; 
Kuratko et al., 2017) to actual and symbolic discourses. At times, symbolic discourses were 
meant to relay future states, which would conditionally become actual pending the stakeholder’s 
support. This makes the orchestrating manager’s role especially difficult, in that he or she must 
keep track of to whom what was promised and whether those expectations will be met on time 
and with any necessary, dependent support from others in place. 
Time is a recurring theme in this work, and as a process work, we add to the broadening 
and respectable field of scholarship seeking temporal understandings of firm innovation 
(Kouamé & Langley, 2018; Paquin & Howard-Grenville, 2013). Researching the actions of 
managers in a firm who are dealing with a rapidly shifting landscape allowed us to observe a 
fascinating diversity of environmental factors that these actors were made to deal with. We 
believe that insights from these are useful for process literature as well as for practitioners who 




On the note of practical implications, our findings suggest that management can actually 
harness the process of seeking legitimacy for the separate but subordinate process of 
ecosystem-building. Orchestrators need to build an ecosystem of complementors who are all 
convinced of the hub firm’s legitimacy, which the managers we focused on achieved in the 
process of venture creation. Crucial to this synchronous result was the bifurcated legitimacy 
campaign to coerce internal and external stakeholders into supporting an innovating 
orchestration system.  
Limitations and future research avenues. 
Our study is not without some limitations, but these also present opportunities for future 
research to advance our work. We have no reason to believe that the dynamics we discussed are 
specific to this ecosystem. The advantage to researching a relatively mundane case rather than a 
highly extraordinary one is that the very dynamics we walk away from this research site with are 
mundane - in the sense that they could happen in any setting where an orchestration strategy 
requiring resources to build and participation of unbound, other parties to power. However, the 
single case nature of our study invokes the common lack of generalizability that comes even with 
researching mundane cases. Future research, then, can explore the veracity of our claims by 
applying more systematic, large-​n​ research methods to explore keystone variables that our 
qualitative research could not. Additionally, we have a thorough understanding of what went on 
within Atos during this time, but research on field-level perspectives of such an event could 





Ecosystem legitimation processes in our digital enabled setting are structured in quite a 
unique way, and tech-savvy fintech actors might yet have to learn how to better integrate 
non-traditional actors in their traditional value chains. We argue, however, that the problems we 
address in our study – such as the necessity to deal with legitimization building and maintenance, 
are universal to all collaborative innovation initiatives. Nevertheless, we highlight the need to 
extend the study of our ecosystem legitimacy-building framing to more industry contexts to 
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Figure 1.​ Conceptual model depicting the process of bifurcated legitimacy campaigning. 
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